Hart and Wechsler\u27s \u3ci\u3eThe Federal Courts and Federal System\u3c/i\u3e by Monaghan, Henry Paul
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
1974 
Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and Federal System 
Henry Paul Monaghan 
Columbia Law School, monaghan@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and Federal System, 87 HARV. L. REV. 889 
(1974). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/795 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For 
more information, please contact cls2184@columbia.edu. 
BOOK REVIEWS
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYsTE . By Paul M. Bator,1 Paul J. Mishkin,' David L. Sha-
piro I & Herbert Wechsler.4 Mineola, New York: The Foundation
Press, Inc. 1973. Pp. lxxxvi, 1657. $22.00.
Reviewed by Henry P. Monaghan5
The first edition of Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and
the Federal System, published in i953, hasdeservedly achieved a
reputation that is extraordinary among casebooks and, indeed,
rare even among learned treatises. Hart & Wechsler I is more than
a stimulating collection of cases and basic source material, and its
scope is not confined to the operation and functioning of the
federal courts in the federal system. Through its extensive notes
and its inimitable leading questions, the book constantly raised
questions which have "prodded . . . students and [teachers] to
think over their heads about the deepest problems of the legal
process." ( Thus, after twenty years, at an age when the typical
casebook slumbers peacefully in retirement, Hart & Wechsler I,
unsupplemented, remained vigorous and active as a tool for
teachers and an authority for lawyers and judges.7
The second edition has been prepared by three outstanding
scholars, Paul M. Bator, Paul J. Mishkin, and David L. Shapiro,
and Herbert Wechsler has contributed an excellent reworking of
the chapter on federal government litigation. The authors avow
that their object is to produce a second edition and not a new book
(p. xvii). Given the conceded excellence of the first edition, the
limited objectives of the second, and the considerable talents of
the new contributors, any reviewer confronts more than the usual
difficulties that come from attempting to review a casebook - a
formidable, highly impressionistic, and perhaps futile task under
the best of circumstances. Be all that as it may, my view is that
the second edition is at nearly every material point better than its
'Professor of Law, Harvard University.
2 Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.
3 Professor of Law, Harvard University.
4 Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of Constitutional Law, Columbia University.
5 Professor of Law, Boston University.
6 Address by Kingman Brewster, Jr., President of Yale University, in awarding
an LL.D. posthumously to Professor Hart, New Haven, Connecticut, June 9, 1969,
quoted in Monaghan, Book Review, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1753 (1970).
I The influence on other casebook writers is pronounced. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON
& D. CuRm, CoNFLicT OF LAws: CASES - COMMENTS - QUESTIONS xii (1968);
G. GUNTHER & N. DOWUXNG, CASES AND MATERIAS ON CONSTITUTIONAY, LAW
(8th ed. 1970).
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predecessor. Hart & Wechsler II would have greatly pleased the
late Henry Hart.
Those familiar with the first edition will readily recognize its
successor. The format is unchanged, the familiar landmark cases
are still there, and the flavor of the first edition has been success-
fully retained. Still, the new authors' contributions are every-
where in evidence: the editing of the original material has been
skillfully done - successfully pruning what, to my mind, had
been an overelaborate presentation of several cases." New cases
and other materials have been adroitly integrated into the book's
structure. ° Moreover, the authors have contributed perspica-
cious questions of their own to the book's famous notes.'0 Perhaps
most importantly, despite the authors' modest description of
their undertaking, there is much in the second edition which finds
no real counterpart in the first. New notes have been added and
old ones substantially recast. The chapter on habeas corpus (ch.
io) is perhaps the most dramatic illustration of change; for all
practical purposes it is wholly new, and it provides the most satis-
factory presentation of these materials I have seen. Ironically, it
may be the first to need further revision, since recent Supreme
Court decisions in that area foretell important changes in doctrine,
including limitations on the use of habeas corpus as a vehicle for
collateral attack of criminal convictions." In short, while one may
s Of particular interest is the elimination of the wonderfully confusing cases (ist
ed. pp. 5o4-i9) dealing with the relationship between the Illinois postconviction
procedure and the "adequate state ground" problem.
9 The excellent integration of new historical materials into chapter x, "The
Development of the Federal Judicial System," deserves special mention. New
materials have been added to existing footnotes (see, e.g., p.x n.x; p.2 n.2), and on
occasions new notes have been supplied (see, e.g., p.9 n.34).
'0 There are particularly incisive notes on the extent to which article III might
be thought to limit the power of Congress to place "article III" cases in federal
legislative courts or administrative agencies (pp. 396-4oo). Other stimulating notes
include those on the "political question" doctrine (pp. 233-41) and Supreme Court
"discretionary" refusals to adjudicate appeals (pp. 656-62).
" Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249 n.38 (1973), reserved the ques-
tion whether Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (x969), should be overruled
-a position expressly urged in a concurring opinion signed by three justices. 412
U.S. at 250-5I. See also Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (973) (holding
FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) (2) a limitation on the claims available on collateral at-
tack) ; Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) (dealing with the effect of a
guilty plea on claims under habeas corpus); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475
(1973) (preventing restrictive habeas corpus doctrine from being sidestepped by
use of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (970)). Against these restrictive precedents, however, a
majority of the Court has succeeded in virtually eliminating the requirement that
the petitioner be "in custody." See Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345
(973). For related developments, see The Supreme Court, z972 Term, 87 HARV.
L. RFv. 55, 263 n.2 (i973). See also Braden v. 3oth Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S.
484 (973) (repudiating Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. i88 (1948)). For citations to
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quarrel with details here and there,' 2 the overriding impression is
of an undertaking superbly accomplished.
I.
The core of Hart & Wechsler I is the relationship between
state and federal law - that is, the factors governing judicial
"choice-of-law" where a constitutional or congressional judg-
ment to displace state law is possible, but not unmistakable. While
the importance of the subject is apparent from the "case or con-
troversy" materials in chapter 2, it stands out in chapter 5's con-
sideration of Supreme Court review of state court decisions. Here
the student first becomes aware of the constant need to dis-
criminate carefully between issues of state and federal law and of
the irritating difficulty of that task. As a teacher, I found the first
edition overelaborate at this point, particularly the materials on
the application of law to fact and on adequacy of state procedural
grounds, and the second edition (pp. 526-620) unfortunately con-
tinues and, indeed, aggravates that defect. Chapter 5 suffers
from a substantial "overbreadth" which ultimately is confusing
rather than clarifying.' 3
the recent literature and an illuminating empirical study, see Shapiro, Federal
Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87 H~Av. L. REV. 321 (i973).
2 Typical of these are the following comments on chapter 5. The elimination
(P. 470) of the first of the two paragraphs of Judge Curtis' argument on the rela-
tionship between the original and appellate jurisdiction seems to me to be an edu-
cational loss and to have reduced the force of the paragraph retained. On the
application of law to fact, the various opinions in Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89
(x964), seem to me a particularly striking example of how the constitutional issues
raised are affected by whether the Court'thinks that it is being called on to pass
on a question of law, of law application, or of fact. I wish it had been reprinted
as a principal case, rather than simply partially excerpted (pp. 591-92, 594). The
new material on the scope of appellate review in free speech cases (pp. 6o3-io)
seems to me needlessly unclear. My own widely ignored article, Monaghan,
Obscenity, x966: The Marriage of Obscenity Per Se and Obscenity Per Quod, 76
YALE L.J. X27, 151-57 (1966), made a conscious effort to separate out the various
free speech issues raised on appeals in obscenity cases. I have, moreover, never
understood why Dice v. Akron, C. & Y.R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952) (p. 562), is not
broken down into its procedural and substantive aspects and integrated into
earlier parts of the chapter. Its substantive aspects- treating the validity of a
release of a federal right as a matter of federal common law- could be con-
trasted, for example, with the materials in note 4 (P. 524) to Ward v. Love County,
253 U.S. 17 (1920) (p. 517) on the limits of state law defenses to federally
created rights. Plainly, in Dice the Court could have held that the validity of the
release was initially a matter of state law, but the particular state rule on the
subject was incompatible with the policies of the federal act. See United States
v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 595-97 (i973).
"At the same time, the well-integrated nature of the text makes it difficult
to overcome this problem by picking and choosing from among these materials.
1974"1
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Chapter 6, The Law Applied in Civil Actions in the District
Courts, is the heart of the "choice-of-law" inquiry. It deals, of
course, with Erie 14 and its convolutions, as well as with the ubiqui-
tous and resilient federal common law. The revised presentation
of the Erie materials reflects the developments in thinking about
conflict of laws which have occurred in the past two decades. For
example, the cases and notes illuminate the difference in views as
to whether the federal diversity court should be considered a "dis-
interested forum" of the state in which it is located, or rather a
disinterested forum in which the "accident of diversity" is an
important factor. 15 And they raise the question of the extent to
which the federal courts have an "interest" in diversity litigation
simply by virtue of being a separate judicial system with its own
rules of procedure and its own statutory and constitutional powers.
Focusing on these issues has obvious bearing for such problems as
the extent to which the court may fashion remedies that the state
law does not afford (the "equitable remedial rights" doctrine),
whether the federal court should or must follow state choice-of-
law rules, and the extent to which the diversity jurisdiction may
permit efficient resolution of multiparty litigation which, at least
today, transcends the capacity of any single state.
I think that the presentation of the materials on the federal
common law is among the most stimulating I have ever encoun-
tered. But I have some reservations about the treatment of Erie.
Professor Currie's materials, of which I have written critically,'0
seem to me superior to Hart & Wechsler I1 in making clear to
students at the outset that Erie is, fundamentally, a limitation on
the federal court's power to displace state law absent some rele-
vant constitutional or statutory mandate which neither the general
language of article III nor the jurisdictional statute provides."7
More generally, I mourn the loss of some illuminating materials
contained in the first edition 18 and the elimination of some of the
authors' penetrating questions, particularly the searching and
14 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
"
5 See D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS: CASES & MATERIALS 620 (1968). It
may be that the district court is simply a "disinterested forum" having no interest
in applying a substantive law other than state law, but that insight provides no
necessary answer to the question of what state's substantive law should be applied.
HART & VECHSLER 11 713-18; D. CuRIUE, supra, at 649-50.
"
0 See Monaghan, supra note 6.
17 D. CuiaE, supra note 15, at 617-20. But cf. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, supra p. 693, 7oo-o6.
"For example, the first edition contained an excellent description of the his-
tory of federal substantive equity (pp. 650-52) which has been truncated (pp.
728-29); for some reason Guardian Say. Co. v. Road Imp. Dist., 267 U.S. I
(1925), has been eliminated despite the contrast it provides to the important de-
cision of Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923) (p. 732).
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destructive criticism of Ragan v. Merchants Transfer & Ware-
house Co.19 I think, too, that the materials on the relationship
between Erie and the federal arbitration act (pp. 730-31) are too
cryptic; that the famous "juster justice" defense of the equitable
remedial rights doctrine has been drained of the grandeur with
which it was originally expounded;" ° and that the important de-
cision in Van Dusen v. Barrack 21 deserves more than a terse and
unilluminating reference (p. 718) in the revisers' rather elaborate
exploration of the basis of Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manu-
facturing Co.22 Choices have to be made, of course; still, as a
teacher, I regret these.
10337 U.S. 530 (1949) (holding FED. R. CIv. P. 3 inapplicable in a diversity
suit, at least on the facts before the Court). After noting that the opinion might
be one in which "lots of different things are being indiscriminately decided," the
first edition asked (p. 674):
Rule 3 has the force of statute, does it not? Must not Justice Douglas
then be saying either that the rule cannot constitutionally be applied in this
case, or that it ought not to be interpreted as excluding the operation of the
Kansas statute in this case? Which?
Is there any foundation for a constitutional doubt? . . . .Do states have
unrestrained power under the Constitution to measure the life of causes of
action they create by events occurring after litigation has begun, by federal
rules, in a federal court, even though the result is to confuse and render
uncertain the application of the federal rules?
Apart from constitutional doubt, is the treatment of Rule 3 justified by
any doctrine or policy of interpretation? What was the purpose of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the light of which they are to be con-
strued? . . . .Is this purpose served by making it impossible for counsel
to rely on the efficacy, in accordance with the terms of the rules, of action
taken in conformity with the rules?
But see Ely, supra note 17, at 714-15 n.i25.
2 0 The first edition asked (p. 652):
Can Guffey be defended on the ground that the federal court was merely
giving a fuller and fairer remedy in the enforcement of state-created rights
and obligations than the state courts would give? Does it offend the con-
stitutional plan, or any valid principle of federalism, to have the federal
courts administer in favor of diverse citizens, this kind of juster justice?
An affirmative answer would require, would it not, a root-and-branch re-
pudiation of the tradition of federal equity in its positive aspects?
The second edition formulates the question as follows (p. 730):
Can Guffey be defended on the ground that the federal court was merely
giving a fuller and fairer remedy in the enforcement of state-created rights
than the state courts would give? Is this simply a matter of a "juster jus-
tice"? What if the courts of a state decide that they will not grant specific
performance of land contracts except in extraordinary cases? Should a
federal court in that state grant specific performance of land contracts in
"ordinary" cases?
The central question, slighted in the second edition, is what the federal diversity
court's "interest" is in providing "juster justice" than that available under state
law.
21 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
22313 U.S. 487 (1941). Barrack is reprinted as a main case at p. 1125 in a
chapter dealing with problems of process and venue. I see no reason why its
choice-of-law aspects could not have been added at p. 718. Compare the imagina-
tive handling of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (PP.
779, 859).
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The initial section of chapter 7 continues the choice-of-law
inquiry in the context of a first-rate presentation of "federal ques-
tion" jurisdiction. The remainder of chapter 7 addresses itself to
various other problems of federal question and diversity jurisdic-
tion in a very satisfactory manner, although the materials bearing
upon the elements of diversity jurisdiction (pp. 1050-1102) seem
a little more complicated than necessary. Chapter 8, "General
Problems of District Court Jurisdiction," and Chapter 9, "Federal
Government Litigation," seem to me to be very good, but I must
confess that I have not tried to teach them in a systematic way.
A teacher using this casebook quickly learns that students
must be helped to cope with the cases' lack of precision and con-
sistency in the use of such terms as "right of action," "duties,"
"remedial rights," "remedies," "cause of action," and "federal
right to a remedy." 23 Some conscious effort should be made to
provide the student with a vehicle for an examination into the
terminology,24 as the revisers did in their own exceedingly helpful
description (p. 770) of what is meant by federal common law.
II.
The role of the federal courts in the protection and enforce-
ment of federally secured rights has changed remarkably since
publication of the first edition. The Supreme Court has virtually
discarded the notion that constitutional exegesis is simply a by-
product of the vindication of private rights and has come to see
itself as having a "special function" to expound on the meaning of
the Constitution and, more generally, to give coherent develop-
ment to the entire corpus of national law. Not surprisingly, the
doctrinal barriers previously limiting Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion (standing, mootness, ripeness, and the political question doc-
trine) have been substantially eroded; 25 and the Court has begun
to erect new barriers to protect its new role, as, for example, in its
decisions declining original jurisdiction of complicated factual
litigation.26
Perhaps even more importantly, the lower federal courts,
acting with the approval of the Supreme Court, have begun to
23 The last term is the revisers' (p. 916) and, so far as I can tell, it has no
analytical utility. Presumably, the revisers mean federal right of action. Questions
relating to the appropriate remedy, federal or state, must be separately identified
and considered. For gross confusion in the use of terms, see Justice Douglas'
opinion in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 238-40 (x969);
compare id. at 255-57 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24 For one such effort, see H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAsIc
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 135-55 (tent. ed. 1958).
2I have discussed these matters in Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication:
The Who and When, 82 YALE L.J. 1363 (I973).
"
0See, e.g., Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
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demonstrate a similar effort to enlarge their own role in the vin-
dication of federal rights. The trend of decisions since Hart &
Wechsler I, however halting and uncertain, has been to confirm
those courts as the "primary and powerful" instruments for the
vindication of federal rights, particularly where actions of state
officials are in issue.27 The net result of these developments has
been the emergence of a federal judicial 'system of a distinctly
different quality from that described in Hart & Wechsler I.
Thus, I think that Hart & Wechsler now really embraces two
major and dissimilar subjects - the relationship between state
and federal law, and the role of the federal courts in the enforce-
ment of federally secured rights. Despite their many overlaps,
these subjects now justify more distinct treatment in a logical
course of study. Relying heavily on the book reviewer's customary
license to chide his authors for the book they might have written
but did not, I urge that, in the third edition, serious consideration
be given to a realignment of the book's format to reflect these
developments. Part I might concern itself with the relationship
between state and federal law; part II, with the role of the federal
courts in the enforcement of federal law; and part III, with mis-
cellaneous problems in the operation of the federal court system.
Reorganization of the materials along lines explicitly con-
cerned with the operation of the federal courts in enforcement of
federal rights would result not only in consolidation of some now
widely dispersed materials,2" but, more importantly, in a sharper
presentation. The initial focus would center on the constitutional
barriers to judicial review (such as "case or controversy") and
the closely related, judicially-fashioned principles governing the
availability of prospective relief, as in actions for declaratory and
injunctive relief.2 9 Consideration could also be given to other
federal remedies, such as "mandamus," 30 removal,31 preconviction
habeas corpus,32 and postconviction relief.33 General statutory
2 7 
F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BusINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT 65
(1927), quoted in Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967).
28 The present format of the book inevitably involves some duplication and
repetition throughout. The theory of "protective jurisdiction" is discussed at pp.
859-70, yet the clearest exposition of the doctrine I have ever seen (or expect to
see) is the revisers' note at pp. 416-i7. The materials on the duty of the state
courts to enforce federal rights appear in at least two different places, pp. 431-38
and pp. 517-26.
29 O'Shea v. Littleton, 42 U.S.L.W. 4139, 4142 (U.S. Jan. 15, 1974). Note here
should be made of the close relationship between these problems and the under-
pinnings of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. See Monaghan, supra note 25, at
1386-89.
3
°See 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (ig7o).
31 See HART & WECHSLER II (pp. 12i8-3o).
32 See Braden v. 3oth Judicial District, 410 U.S. 485 (,973).
13 In addition to the materials in chapter io of the casebook, see Preiser v.
19741
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problems such as the anti-injunction and three-judge court acts,
and the jurisdictional amount requirement, while important, do
not operate as substantial judicial door-closing devices, and they
could easily be woven into these materials. Suits against state
officials to vindicate federal rights, particularly civil and political
rights, could be considered in light of whatever supposed federal-
ism considerations, statutory or judge-made (principally absten-
tion, exhaustion, and limitations on prospective relief against
enforcement of state criminal laws), might be thought to bear
upon these problems.
I have found the educational perspectives gained by such an
approach quite useful. Hart & Wechsler II does not foreclose such
a teaching approach, but neither does it facilitate it, given the
revisers' rigid determination to adhere to the format of the first
edition. The "case or controversy" materials, particularly on
"mootness" (pp. io7-2o) and "standing" (pp. 15o--214) are, in
my judgment, both bulky and tedious. They obscure the inquiry
whether, and in what circumstances, constitutional adjudication
should be viewed as simply a byproduct of the vindication of
private rights rather than as an opportunity to formulate and
refine basic uniform principles of constitutional law within judi-
cially imposed limitations and subject to some congressional con-
trol.34 Moreover, the constitutional and discretionary consider-
ations bearing upon the availability of prospective relief would
have benefited from a comparison with considerations governing
the Supreme Court's "discretionary" refusals to review ostensibly
obligatory appeals (pp. 649-62) or to exercise its original juris-
diction (pp. 277-87). And I see little to be gained by separate
treatment of the "sovereign immunity" of the United States (pp.
1339-77) and of the states (pp. 926-37), to say nothing of sepa-
rate treatment of sovereign immunity in the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction (pp. 256-58). Surely so far as the role of the
federal courts in vindicating federal rights is concerned, that mat-
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 ('973), noted in The Supreme Court, x972 Term, supra
note xi, at 263, on the relationship between habeas corpus and actions under §
1983. 42 U.S.C. § X983 (1970).
"
4 See Monaghan, supra note 25. Moreover, several interesting case-or-contro-
versy problems are wholly ignored: the role of Congress in substantive constitu-
tional definition, see Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determination, 40
U. CIN. L. RV. 199, 233-34 (971) ; prospective overruling, see G. GARVEY, CON-
STITUTIONAL BRICOLAGE, 61-65 (97X); Miskin, The Supreme Court, z964 Term -
Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process of Time and
Law, 79 HARv. L. REV. 56, 70-7, (1965) ; the act-of-state doctrine, see First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); and Justice Black's
suggestion that for a court to overrule its previous construction of a statute may
pose article III problems, see Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 257-58 (197o) (dissenting opinion).
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ter could usefully be approached as a single unit.35
Once the present dimensions of the federal judicial system are
explored, the extent of its dependency upon the sufferance of the
political branches of government would be considered, in my pro-
posed reorganization, by examining the role of Congress in regu-
lating the jurisdiction of and remedies available in the federal
(and state) courts. The present materials (ch. 4) on this compli-
cated and intriguing subject deserve special mention. Not only
have they been carefully updated, but the revisers have supplied
valuable contributions of their own. The result is an excellent
and exciting piece of work. Hart's famous "Dialogue", a very
valuable feature, is preserved (pp. 33o-6o). To compensate for
its age two techniques have been used: first, some new footnotes
have been supplied; second, there is a supplementary section of
new developments.
I do have some minor criticisms of this chapter. I see very
little point to the extensive discussion of the selective service
cases (pp. 365-72). And the revisers might have given more
prominent attention to two matters. The first is the extent to
which the substantive constitutional guarantees, such as the first
amendment, might themselves constitute sources for inferring a
limitation on the power of Congress to regulate the jurisdiction
and remedies available in the federal courts. While that issue is
considerably clearer now than when Professor Hart wrote, it is
treated by the revisers quite tersely.86 The second matter to
which I believe far more explicit attention should be given is the
impact of recent thinking discarding "privilege" notions in cases
of government benefits, licenses, etc. (p. 347 n.27), with respect
to a right to judicial review of cases where "Plaintiffs [are]
Complaining about Decisions in Connection with Non-Coercive
Governmental Programs" (pp. 346-48). These "new property"
concepts 37 do not necessarily mean that some judicial review
must exist; but they do make more likely Hart's suggestion (p.
348) that in principle many of the cases should be assimilated to
those where a plaintiff is complaining of "extrajudicial" coercion
by the government.38
35 Professor Gunther has, in fact, presented a most satisfactory brief integra-
tion of the foregoing materials in his casebook on constitutional law, G. GUNTHER
& N. DOWLNG, supra note 7, at 1-198, and I have made a similar effort in a
recent Article, Monaghan, supra note 25.
36 Compare p. 334 n.7 & P. 339 n.16 with, e.g., the suggestions in my Article,
Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process", 83 HARv. L. REV. 5,8, 520-26, 543-51
(1970).
37 Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
38 1t may be that the time has come to recognize that the due process clause
guarantees some judicial review of the constitutional propriety of all governmental
19741
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III.
While I cannot shake the feeling that the time has come for
a thorough reexamination of the book's format, I do not advance
the suggestion with any considerable confidence. I do not know
whether the restructuring here proposed would have costs ex-
ceeding the gains for Hart & Wechsler. In any event, Hart &
Wechsler II is, like its predecessor, a great work. We are fortunate
to have it.
One final comment. Regular supplements, please l
[Vol. 87
